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PRIVATIZATION IN POLAND: OBSTACLES
AND OPTIONS-AN ILLUSTRATION
JOHN I. HUHS *
Not too many years ago, I met Professor Rapaczynski while travelling
to Warsaw and again when I was in New York. In those days we were
full of hope. The wall was coming down. Poland had freedom. Privatiza-
tion was going forward. It was all going to happen quickly. As we now
know, it does not happen that way because you do not dismantle decades
of communist dictatorship in a month, or a year, or five years, or even in
a decade. This is not going to be a fast or easy process. There will be
reversals; in many countries there will be substantial reversals. We think
that the ultimate trend will be forward, but it will not be easy.
I would like to present an anecdote of our experience with Poland's
privatization process. It was a project to which we and our United States
client devoted a considerable amount of time attempting to establish a
venture with the Polish copper monopoly.
Poland is the world's sixth largest producer of refined copper. Copper
may be Poland's largest single cash export, Miners in Poland, like miners
worldwide, are implacable, and they are not an easy group with which to
negotiate. The Polish copper monopoly is one of Poland's most aggressive
enterprises. Long before we met with them, they had hired one of the best
mining consulting firms in the United States. They were well underway
with the privatization process, putting their books in order and frying to
arrive at the appropriate valuation of the company. Nevertheless, we
encountered several problem areas: management, workers, liabilities of the
company, governmental process, and facilities. I will address some of
these issues.
First, and perhaps most important, is the issue of existing management.
Management of companies, like politicians, academics, and lawyers, have
one primordial instinct-survival. The management of this company was
virtually independent, and they were afraid that they would lose their jobs
if the company was acquired by a foreign interest. Moreover, they formed
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an alliance with the workers council, who were also afraid of job losses,
and the local politicians. As a result, we faced constant sabotage from
management. The articles that appeared in the press were unbelievable.
The most embarrassing sections from our correspondence, memoranda,
proposals, and internal company correspondence were leaked to the press,
and we were made to look terrible. The chief executive of our client read
a translation of what appeared in the Warsaw Press. He wondered, "Do we
need this? Is this something we want to deal with? These people are out
to get us."
We experimented with various ways to inspire management to go
along with us, but there was one thing we were not going to do: We were
not going to put a significant amount of our money into this company
without having control over the company. If we could not exert control
over the company, then we would invest our money in one of the many
more hospitable investment environments in the world, including the
United States. The workers, fearful of losing their jobs, independence, and
control, were also able to influence events through the workers council,
which is a potent political force within the company. As a result, we also
faced sabotage from the workers.
There were, however, factions within the worker's council that favored
our investment because of health and safety reasons. We were going to
introduce the workers to the most modem Western health and safety
programs. We were also going to introduce work rules and mining
methods that were designed to protect them from cave-ins. In the end, I
think the workers were much more favorable to us than management. A
strong minority on the worker's council supported us, and our relationship
continues to develop.
Another category of problems is liability for past activities. This area
must be watched carefully, particularly with a mining company, because
mining is not friendly to the environment. An example is lead pollution
of ground waters, which creates a very high incidence of abnormal births
and malformed children. Moreover, the smelters belch sulfur dioxide into
the atmosphere. Because of the potential environmental liabilities, our
proposal included a cap on our exposure for environmental cleanup. We
would, of course, fulfill our environmental obligations going forward, but
we were not going to be responsible for past environmental damage
because it would be too difficult to quantify.
Another aspect of a privatizing a company, particularly a large
integrated company, is that when you buy the whole company, you also
buy its responsibilities. A good twenty percent of the company we looked
at was devoted to manufacturing outdated mining equipment. Clearly, we
did not want this part of the company. The same was true for the mining
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enterprises research institute. I suppose we needed a few researchers, a
small R & D area perhaps, but not 800 scientists and engineers at the
research institute and an equal number at the engineering bureau. But
again, that came along with the company.
Hospitals, sanitoriums, and schools also came with the company. It
was not that we opposed these activities, it was just that we did not know
anything about running a hospital. We did not know anything about
running a sanitorium. We did not want to pay for them and dissipate our
management expertise on activities that were not part of our core business.
Our core business is mining, smelting, and refining. We are the best in the
world. We know how to mine. We know how to smelt. We know how
to refine. We wanted to bring this expertise to Poland.
You must also learn to deal with the government because it responds
more to political pressures than the necessities of the privatization program.
It is motivated by one fear-they cannot sell to these foreigners too
cheaply. This thinking, that somehow the government officials involved
will be criticized for selling the crown jewels too cheaply, pervaded many
of our discussions, as it pervades the privatization processes throughout
Eastern Europe and Russia.
Also, the government often has very little power to make its decisions
stick. When dealing with a privatization decision that affects, for example,
the mining industry in Poland, which is a vital national industry, the
government will back down if the miners decide to strike. Accordingly,
we did not know with whom we could make our deal. We thought we had
made some progress in Warsaw, but when we went to talk to the worker's
council, local politicians, and the management, we discovered that each had
its own idea of what the deal should be. Each one believes that it is (or
should be) the decision maker. In the end, it turned out that everyone had
the right to say no, but nobody had the right to say yes.
One answer to the foregoing problems is to not purchase a privatized
company, but consider forming a joint venture. Set up a completely new
company. Invest in the joint venture company, and have the existing
mining company transfer certain key assets to the new joint venture
company as its share of the investment. The entire cash investment, in this
case, would go to the acquisition of fresh assets such as new mining
equipment, new smelters, new refineries, and new health and safety
facilities, rather than to the acquisition of old assets.
Existing management would not lose their positions under such a
scenario because the original mining company would continue to exist,
albeit in a somewhat slimmed-down version. The new joint venture
company would hire the managers who want to join it and whom we want
to hire, and we would hire the workers who want to join us and whom we
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want to hire,
Another option is to set up a wholly-owned subsidiary. It is possible
for such a subsidiary to acquire state assets that are being privatized or to
construct a completely new factory. Such a transaction can be completed
rapidly, with a minimum of negotiations and red tape.
As you can see, investing in privatized industry in an Eastern or
Central European country can be a risky and frustrating proposition.
However, through joint ventures or establishing wholly-owned subsidiaries,
it is possible to reduce obstacles and make a profitable investment.
